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From And The
Word of G-d From (Isaiah 2:3) |
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Rabbi Yehudah Deri's Shiurim on Yorah Deah Shiur 4 - "Not bar
Not" Translated and transcribed by: Gemora: Chulin:
111b It was stated: (In the case of)
fish served on a meat vessel. Rav said: It is forbidden to eat the fish with
cheese. Shmuel said it was permitted. Rav said it
was forbidden (since) the meat gives a taste (notan tam). Shmuel
says it is permitted (since) the meat gives a secondary taste(notan tam bar notan
tam). Explanation : The Torah forbids a combination
of meat and milk or a combination of heter and eisor
in two cases: The Gemora
sugiah
is concerned with "not bar
not" (the abbreviation of notan ta'am bar notan ta'am); where the taste is a
secondary taste. For example the cases in our Gemora: 1. Fish is served or cooked in a
vessel in which meat was previously cooked. The meat or the vessel was hot
enough for the meat taste to be transferred into the vessel. The vessel now
has a principal taste of meat. If fish is then placed in the vessel, and
either the vessel or fish were hot enough to transfer taste, the fish
receives the secondary taste of the meat (the vessel having the primary
taste) 2. In the second case, a knife
was used to cut hot meat and thus received a primary taste of meat. Latter on
during the same day the knife was use to cut tznon. The tzon
thus received a secondary meat taste. Rav states that it is forbidden (osser ) to eat
the fish with cheese. Shmuel states that it is
permitted (mutar).
Abaya states that the fish may be eaten with cheese but not the tznon.
On the face of it Rav's reasoning is clear: Once there is a taste of issur
in a substance what difference does it make if that taste is a principal or
secondary one. The heter
of Shmuel, however, requires explanation. For since
there is not sixty parts of fish to nullify
(mvatel) the taste of meat imparted by
the vessel, why is "not bar
not" permitted? Simply it seems that Shmuel holds that not
bar not is a ta'am
clusha (a weak,
or ineffective taste). This could either mean that: 1. Such a weak taste does not
impart a taste that is significant and therefore it is, in effect, not
tasted. This being the reason that it is permitted. 2. Alternatively, he could hold
that a not bar not
taste is not halachically considered a taste of eiser
but rather a taste of heter
even when the issur
can apparently still be tasted. In other words, when the Torah or the Rabbis
forbade ta’am c’ikur (the taste of issur) it was only limited to a
principal and not a secondary taste. Three clarifications must
be made in the case of a vessel about which the halachah
states that not
bar not is
permitted: Preface:There are three levels of contact between the
fish and the meat vessel by which a taste of meat could be imparted into the
fish: 1. The first is eiroyi
(pouring one onto another). Question 1. Does the heter of not bar not apply only to the
first level? For in the first level the degree of contact, and therefore the
extent to which the taste of issur may be transferred, is lessened. Or
does the heter
apply to the second or third levels as well? A. The first view: The language of the Gemora
is that fish was served on a vessel which had absorbed the taste of meat and
either the fish or the vessel (or both) were sufficiently hot to transfer the
taste. The first view holds that only in this case
where the fish was served and not cooked does Shmuel
permit not bar not
since the taste's transfer between the vessel and the fish only comes from
contact and therefore is not so great. B. The second
view is
that Shmuel would permit not bar not even if the fish was cooked in the
meat vessel, regardless of the fact that there was a greater transfer of
taste from the meat absorbed in the vessel. C. The third view is that Shmuel would allow not
bar not (that is to eat the fish with cheese) even where the fish
was roasted or fried in the vessel without any addition of liquid. Roasting
or frying would certainly increase the transfer of the taste even more than
cooking. The following
objection could be raised against views B and C: If the Gemora
wanted to permit not bar not
even by cooking or roasting, then it should not have used the language of
"alu"
which means placing or pouring without cooking. However, we can remove this
objection by explaining that the statement comes to show us the strength of
Rav. For Rav would maintain a strict
(machmir) view and forbid not bar not even in such an easy
or linient (makil) case. Shmuel,
on the other hand, would be makil even in the cases of cooking or
roasting. Question 2. The next question for
clarification is whether the heter of not bar not is solely a din in boser b’halav
or whether it also applies to other
issurim (prohibitions). Do we say that
exclusively in boser b’halav,
where each of the components are mutar on their own, do
we allow such a heter,
but in other prohibitions (sha’ar
isorim) where the taste of the actual issur
is present, we do not permit not
bar not, or do we say say in both cases
the heter
applies? Question 3. The third clarification is
whether the rule of not bar not is
l'hatchilah
(allowed even in the first instance) or only b'dieved (allowed only
after the fact). In other words, whether one is permitted l'hatchilah to place or
cook fish in a meat vessel in order to eat it with cheese or whether it is
only after the fish was placed or cooked in the vessel (which itself is of
course mutar) that then b'dieved
it can be eaten with cheese. There is a further question concerning the case
of b'dieved
which is even more machmir:
Even after the fish was put or cooked in the vessel, is it forbidden l'hatchila
to eat it with cheese or only b'dieved if it was already mixed with
cheese is it permitted to eat? This question is again an argument (machlokus) among the Rishonim.
Answers: As to the first
question, the degree of contact between the fish and the meat vessel, the Rivan and Rabbenu Tam learn Rashi's opinion in two ways. a. According to the Rivan the only thing permitted is placing the fish in the
meat vessel. The Rivan has a strong proof for his opinion from Rashi's explanation of the case of the knife used to cut
meat and then tznon.
The tznon is forbidden because it is charif
(pungent) and brings out much more of the meat taste which was absorbed in
the knife than the other vegetable. Surely cooking in a vessel which brings
out the taste absorbed in the vessel and transfers it into the fish must be
forbidden. For cooking is a greater force than the pungent nature (charifut) of the tznon which brought the
taste out of the knife. Therefore, a proof can be brought from here that Rashi holds that only placing the fish in the meat vessel is
permitted and cooking would be forbidden. Rabbeinu Tam, on the other hand,
learns Rashi differently. In explaining the
expression not bar not
Rashi states that if the fish were cooked with
actual meat it would be forbidden to eat with
cheese. Since Rashi gives the example of
"cooking" together, it is possible to infer that if the first was
cooked in a vessel which only had the taste of meat it would be permitted,
according to Shmuel. As to the case of the tznon,
Rabbeinu Tam relies on the second explanation of Rashi that the reason why the tznon is forbidden is
because of the fatty substances of meat which are left on the knife but not
seen and are absorbed into the tznon. Tznon is charif
and absorbs more easily than fish and the absorbtion
is assisted by the pressure of the knife. Both of these factors are necessary
for the tznon
to absorb the unseen fatty particles which give a primary meat taste. It
would therefore be forbidden to eat it with cheese. Neither of these factors apply to fish. It can be explained
that the Rivan holds that Rashi
was in doubt as to the limit of the heter of not bar not i.e. whether it
was just placing the fish in the vessel or even cooking. The Rivan therefore himself holds l'chumreh to limit it
to the first case. Rabbeinu Tam, on the other hand,
holds that the second view that even cooking is permitted, is a certain din both for Rashi and himself. The key to
understanding the sugiah
is found in the chakirah
of the Rosh Yosef. Rav's reason is simple - not bar not
is oser
because there remains the ta'am of eisur.
Shmuel however can be explained in two ways : a. On one side it can
be said that in not bar not
the taste is weakened to such a great extent by virtue of the second removal
from the source of eisur
that we say that it can be assumed (m'stumah) that there is no taste of eissur.
Rav would say that the question of whether there is an issur is to be
determined in accordance with the normal rules of bitul i.e. a proportion
of one in less than sixty is osser, one in more than sixty is mutar.
Shmuel says that this case is different i.e. when
there is not bar not
it can be assumed that there is no such taste even if the proportion is less
than sixty against one. b. On the other side Shmuel will say that there is a din that not bar not is mutar i.e. that even if there is a taste, it is a taste
of heter
and not of issur.
According to this chakira,
the Rosh Yosef makes two nufka
a. If it is possible
to taste the ta'am
even in a not bar not,
then according to the first side of the chakirah it will be
forbidden, because there is, in practice, a taste of issur even though it is not bar not. In such a case,
even Shmuel would agree that it was forbidden.
According to the second view, such a taste does not concern us, because it is
not a taste of issur but a taste of heter.
b. Concerning issurim
which are not botel even in a thousand, for
example, spices or an entire entity in the form that it was created (beriah); If the heter is because of the
absence of taste, then the absence of taste will not help because by
definition the mixture is osser even if there is no taste for in
such cases there is no rule of bitul. If, however, the din is that not bar not is a permitted
taste, here too in these cases it would be permitted. It is possible to
clarify the three questions stated above with this chakira: a. If we say that the
reason is based on the assumption that there is no taste, then only in the
weaker case of putting the fish in the meat vessel can we make this
assumption, but cooking or direct heat would be osser since it is more
likely to transfer taste. If it is a din
that the taste in muttar,
then it makes no difference what degree of transference takes place, for it
is a transfer of heter.
b. If it is a
question of a weak taste (ta'am klusha)
that cannot be tasted, then no difference can be made between boser b’halev
and sha’ar issurim.
Since the heter
depends on taste, the sole question is whether there is a taste or not. If
however there is a din
that the taste of nor bar not
is mutar,
it is understandable that the Rabbis would permit not bar not in boser b’halav
where each of the elements in the combination are permitted on their own and
only the combination are forbidden, but not in sha'ar issurim.
For with boser b'halav the
Rabbis could delineate the taste of not
bar not as a permitted taste; but not in sha’ar issurim
where there is a taste of actual issur, which could not
in any circumstances be called a ta'am of heter.
c. Finally, if the heter
is based on ta'am then we would say that the
rule that not bar not
is permitted is only b'dieved,
for how can we permit someone to put a taste of meat (albeit a secondary
taste) with cheese. On the other hand if it is a din, then there would be no objection even l'hatchila
for the taste of meat in the fish is a permitted taste. We can also apply
this chakira
to a machlokos
of Rashi and Tosefos in
the sugia.
The Gemora states that the rule of Rav i.e. not bar not is oser
was not stated by him specifically but derived from a case. Rav visited by a
Rabbi, had eye ache, they heated up ointment in a vessel for his eye and then
cooked a dish (tavshil) for him in the same vessel.
He said that he could taste the ointment in the food. Apparently this is the
source of the statement that Rav holds that not bar not would be oser.
The Gemora replies, not so, ointment is different
because it is bitter. According to Rashi, the Gemora when it says
"not so", it means that it rejects the proof of Rav, i.e. that
according to Shmuel the fact that it is possible to
taste the ointment in a not bar
not does not mean we could taste meat in the fish, for ointment is
different because it is stronger. This explanation fits well with the side of
the chakirah
that the dispute is whether we assume there is a taste or not. Rav says we
do, he tasted the ointment in the food, and he does not distinguish between
ointment and other foods. Shmuel says we do not, ointment is different because it is bitter. According to Tosefos, the Gemora when it
says "not so" rejects the statement that Rav's
view is inferred from the case of the ointment . Rav’s view was stated expressly and not learnt from the
story of the ointment . According to Tosefos, Rav would agree that ointment is different
because it is bitter. The dispute between Rav and Shmuel
is therefore expressed in the case of fish, and fits well with the side of
the chakirah
that the issue between them is din.
The view that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel
concerns a ta'am klusha
as seen in the case of the ointment was only a possibility (hava aminah ) which the Gemora rejected .. Source Material
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